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63 
RETHINKING HOW VOTERS CHALLENGE 
GERRYMANDERING: CONGRESS, COURTS, AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Megan Wilson* 
 
          “Constitutions are not ephemeral documents, designed to meet 
passing occasions. The future is their care, and therefore, in their 
application, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of 
what may be.” 
– Justice William Brennan1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, President Trump won the electoral college but lost the 
popular vote by almost 2.9 million votes.2 Unsurprisingly, the election 
sparked a heated debate about the effectiveness of our voting system 
and the role of the electoral college.3 What has been surprising is the 
public’s increased interest in the effect gerrymandering has on 
elections.4 
Arguably, voting rights received the highest level of attention 
from the public and legal scholars during the 1960s civil rights 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Psychology, Loyola 
Marymount University, Los Angeles. I would like to thank my parents, Peter Wilson and Glenda 
Sanders, for all their guidance, support, and last-minute edits. Special thanks to Professor Justin 
Levitt for his willingness to debate with me and helping shape this paper, as well as Ariana 
Rodriguez for being a tireless editor and friend. Finally, I would like to thank Loyola Law Review 
members for all their help during the writing and editing process. 
 1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). 
 2. Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN 
(Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-
clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html. 
 3. See, e.g., Alvin Chang, Trump Will Be the 4th President to Win the Electoral College After 
Getting Fewer Votes than His Opponent, VOX (Dec. 16, 2016, 1:37 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/9/13572112/trump-popular-vote-loss. 
 4. G. Terry Madonna & Michael Young, Guest Column: How Gerrymandering is Damaging 
Our Political Process, DAILY TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.delcotimes.com/opinion/guest-
column-how-gerrymandering-is-damaging-our-political-process/article_a36acbe4-3c36-52e2-
be4c-51d539a753f4.html (noting that public interest in gerrymandering often “waxes and wanes” 
in accordance with the decennial census). 
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movement.5 The Warren Court would make a number of decisions that 
extended voting rights protections, in what would come to be known 
as the reapportionment revolutions.6 However, public interest in 
protecting voting rights would wane until the mid to late 80s, when 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act.7 Again, this interest would 
not last, and by the 90s growing numbers of white voters viewed the 
protections afforded by the Voting Rights Act as unfairly giving 
minority groups political advantages over white voters.8 
In contrast, the current interest in voting rights shows an increased 
concern with gerrymandering’s ability to undermine elections.9 With 
that concern has come a push by the public for something to be done. 
Possibly as a response to this public concern, the Supreme Court has 
taken on two partisan gerrymandering cases this term.10 Despite the 
public and legal community’s renewed interest in gerrymandering 
claims, little attention has been given to state court voting rights 
decisions.11 
This Note will argue that the attention devoted to voting rights 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is misplaced because 
“state courts are the primary actors in shaping the right to vote” and 
protecting the integrity of the election process.12 Part II of this Note 
will provide a basic background on gerrymandering and the United 
States political system. Part III will give an overview of federal 
redistricting jurisprudence to show how the Supreme Court has limited 
possible voting rights violations under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
only cases where the plaintiff has been denied a chance to influence 
the political process as a whole, which may be an impossible standard. 
Part IV explains how Congressional non-involvement and federal 
jurisprudence has led to unchecked gerrymandering. As a result, 
 
 5. RICHARD K. SCHER ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, ix–x (1997). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at x. 
 8. Id. at xi–xii. 
 9. Madonna & Young, supra note 4. 
 10. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Take Up a Second Gerrymandering Case This 
Term, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/2017/12
/08/4fde65f4-dc66-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html. 
 11. Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2016) (noting 
that studies show media coverage of state courts is disproportionately low given the importance of 
their decisions). 
 12. Id. 
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gerrymandering has increased, undermining the Framers’ intent to 
create a representative government, and suppresses elections. 
Finally, Part V will argue that state courts are better situated than 
federal courts to protect the right to vote. Drawing on the cases 
discussed in Part II, this Part will explain how federal courts are 
limited by the United States Constitution’s lack of expressed 
protection for voting rights. In contrast, the constitutions of forty-nine 
states contain language directly protecting the right to vote. 
Furthermore, the Note will argue that state courts have historically 
been the protector of individual rights and should, therefore, interpret 
their own constitutional protections as stronger than those of the 
United States Constitution. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF GERRYMANDERING AND THE UNITED STATES 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
By the time the Constitutional Convention was held in 1787, the 
Founding Fathers had already decided that America’s national 
elections would use a representative system, rather than a direct 
democracy.13 The process of electing representatives to the Senate and 
House of Representatives established two approaches to 
representation.14 The Senate would be made of two members from 
every state and thus, representation would be based on state interests, 
regardless of each state’s population.15 The number of members in the 
House would be decided based on population, with each House 
member originally representing 30,000 people, a number that would 
increase over time.16 
Because population growth in the United States is never stable, 
redistricting and reapportionment are necessary to ensure that each 
district is comprised of the correct number of voters.17 State and local 
governments use the House model of representation and also require 
regular redistricting.18 Issues arise and courts are called on to intervene 
when people believe that the methods or manner of redistricting are 
unfair and undermine the political process. One such problematic 
method of redistricting is gerrymandering, or political redistricting, 
 
 13. SCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 4. 
 18. Id. 
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which is the “deliberate effort[] to draw district lines for political 
advantage.”19 
State legislatures use three common gerrymandering techniques 
to redistrict to their advantage: packing, shacking, and cracking.20 
These techniques help a party create a map that ensures it will win the 
most seats possible and waste the opposing party’s votes.21 Cracking 
is the process of breaking up large groups of opposing party voters and 
placing them in districts that heavily support the controlling party.22 
However, in areas where the vote is competitive, a party will instead 
redistrict by packing as many opposing party voters into as few 
districts as possible.23 While packing requires giving up some seats, it 
ensures a win in most of the districts.24 Finally, shacking is used to 
challenge the success of an opposing party’s incumbent 
representative.25 This can be done by moving an incumbent’s 
residence to a new district, preventing her from relying on the 
constituents who previously elected her.26 Alternatively, two 
incumbents from the opposing party can be placed in the same district, 
which forces them to compete for a single seat.27 
Although the power to oversee the logistics of federal elections 
has been granted to Congress by the United States Constitution,28 
Congress has rarely provided any instructions on how to appropriately 
 
 19. Id. at 19. The term gerrymandering is derived from the combination of the words Gerry 
and salamander. In response to efforts by Massachusetts governor, Elbridge Gerry, to redraw 
districts to favor his party, a cartoon was published depicting a district shaped like a salamander, 
including an embellished forked tongue, wings, and talons. Id. at 19–20. 
 20. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review 
of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551–52 (2004). 
 21. Id. at 551. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 551–552. 
 24. Id. at 552. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members 
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall 
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 
(“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own 
Members . . . .”). 
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draw district lines.29 One consequence has been vote dilution, meaning 
a person’s vote can have different weight depending on where the 
voter lives.30 For example, the number of House representatives from 
each state was originally determined by population and every House 
representative was elected by districts with about the same 
population.31 Over time, the number of members in the House grew in 
response to population growth.32 However, in response to the 1910 
Census, Congress capped the number of House representatives at 
435.33 Because the United States population was growing but new 
House seats were not being added, voter dilution happened in two 
significant ways.34 
First, representatives in states with smaller population growth 
could be elected with a smaller number of votes than representatives 
in states with larger population growth because new representatives 
were not being added to account for population differences.35 Second, 
within states, the population in urban areas grew much more rapidly 
than in rural areas.36 In some states the difference in populations 
between districts could be as high as three to one.37 The effect was an 
over representation of rural, usually white, voters because House 
members elected from those districts represented far fewer people than 
those elected by urban voters.38 
Modern voter dilution, caused by state legislatures’ 
gerrymandering, can be traced back to judicial non-involvement. 
Because Congress has not exercised much control over state 
redistricting, court decisions have signaled to state legislatures how 
aggressively they can gerrymander.39 For example, in 2004, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer,40 although only a 
plurality, “sent a clear signal that a majority of the Court was not 
 
 29. ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA: THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE FUTURE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 24 
(2016). 
 30. See id. at 23. 
 31. SCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
 32. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 25. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 26. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 185. 
 40. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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inclined to overturn districting plans on grounds of partisan 
gerrymandering.”41 Given the impact judicial decisions have on a 
legislature’s ability to gerrymander, Part III will give an overview of 
the development of federal jurisprudence on redistricting. 
III.  ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF JUSTICIABILITY AND THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 
REDISTRICTING CLAIMS 
Federal court decisions, compared with state court decisions, 
receive a majority of the attention from legal scholars and the media.42 
There are practical reasons for this. When the Supreme Court 
interprets federal law, the opinion will apply nationwide.43 Even 
decisions made in lower federal courts generally have a larger 
geographic reach than state courts.44 Thus, federal courts may be seen 
as the ideal place to challenge gerrymandering because of the impact 
the decisions have. But, as described below, federal jurisprudence on 
gerrymandering has evolved to make federal courts a less desirable 
forum. 
Section A gives examples of early redistricting cases and judicial 
response. It will introduce the concepts of justiciability and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections against vote dilution. Section B shows two 
kinds of claims that the Court has found to be justiciable: racial 
discrimination and unequal populations. Next, Section C highlights 
the difficulty the Court has had in applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to purely political redistricting cases. Finally, Section D 
gives an overview of one of the most recent gerrymandering cases to 
come before the Supreme Court, but suggests even if the Court holds 
that the claims are justiciable, the protections offered may be 
insufficient to stop gerrymandering. 
A.  The Court’s Early Response to Gerrymandering 
Because Congress has generally been uninvolved in regulating 
the redistricting process, court decisions, particularly those by federal 
courts, have become the ultimate authority. Thus, until the 1960s, 
when courts first held the judiciary could intervene in redistricting 
 
 41. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 2. 
 42. Douglas, supra note 11, at 2. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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matters, state governments were relatively unrestrained in how they 
redistricted.45 While cases decided before 1960 would be unsuccessful 
at challenging redistricting, the issues discussed in these early cases 
would become the foundation of the modern debate about judicial 
intervention in redistricting. 
In Wood v. Broom,46 the Court held that the Apportionment Act 
of 1911’s equal, contiguous, and compact requirements were 
applicable only to the 1910 apportionment cycle and thus, did not 
apply to redistricting after the Apportionment Act of 1929.47 More 
importantly, the Court acknowledged the potential for justiciability 
being an issue in redistricting cases.48 However, the Court ended the 
opinion by stating “[u]pon these questions the Court expresses no 
opinion.”49 
 Next, in 1946, based on the holding in Wood, the Court in 
Colegrove v. Green50 again rejected a claim based on the equal, 
contiguous, and compact requirements of the 1911 Act.51 Petitioners 
claimed that because Illinois’s legislature had failed to redistrict since 
1901, the state’s districts violated the Apportionment Act of 1911 and 
their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.52 
However, in his opinion, Justice Frankfurter chose to frame the issue 
as a question of whether the Court could redraw Illinois’s map to 
comply with 1911 Act.53 The opinion stated, “Courts ought not to 
enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is 
to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke 
the ample powers of Congress.”54 
Colegrove was decided by a 4-3 plurality, with Justice Rutledge 
concurring only with the result. He instead argued that such claims 
could be justiciable but “only in the most compelling 
circumstances.”55 
 
 45. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 185. 
 46. 287 U.S. 1 (1932). 
 47. Id. at 8. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
 51. Id. at 551. 
 52. Id. at 550. 
 53. Id. at 551–52. 
 54. Id. at 556. 
 55. Id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
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In contrast, Justice Black, supported by two Justices, argued in 
the dissent that the Court could rule on this claim because the 
redistricting violated the Fourteenth Amendment.56 He reasoned that 
there is no difference between a state legislature denying a person the 
right to vote and “destroy[ing] the effectiveness of their vote.”57 In 
either situation, “the admitted result is that the Constitutional policy 
of equality of representation has been defeated.”58 He also dismissed 
concerns that redistricting is a political question because it concerns 
politics.59 Citing various cases,60 Justice Black showed that courts 
have and should step in to protect individual rights, including the right 
to vote.61 
The Colegrove opinion raised two important questions about the 
federal courts’ involvement in overseeing redistricting. First, if voters 
and Congress have the power to stop legislatures from improperly 
redistricting, should the courts intervene? Second, in what 
circumstances could the Fourteenth Amendment be used to challenge 
redistricting? 
B.  Compelling Circumstances as the Basis for the Equal Protection 
Clause Voting Rights Jurisprudence 
While the immediate result of the Colegrove decision was judicial 
noninvolvement, Justice Rutledge’s “compelling circumstances” 
doctrine would become the basis for one of the first successful 
redistricting challenges.62 
In 1960, Gomillion v. Lightfoot63 established a common 
“compelling circumstance” for judicial intervention: racial 
 
 56. Id. at 570 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 571. 
 58. See id. at 572. 
 59. Id. at 573. 
 60. Compare Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 539 (1927) (rejecting the argument that a claim 
raises a political question if the subject of the suit is political as “little more than a play upon words” 
and holding claims based on evasions of political rights are justiciable), and Smiley v. Holm, 285 
U.S. 355, 369–70 (1932) (holding that courts could rule on constitutionality of laws that “govern[] 
the exercise of political rights”), with Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (declining to enforce 
political rights because relief sought by plaintiffs, judicial supervision to ensure specific 
performance of state electoral legislation, was not judicially manageable), and Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939) (holding that claims challenging the ratification process of a 
Constitutional amendment involved a political question because Congress, not the courts, has final 
authority). 
 61. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 572–73. 
 62. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 29. 
 63. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
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discrimination. There, plaintiffs claimed that the boundaries of the 
City of Tuskegee, Alabama, had been redrawn to exclude the majority 
black communities.64 They argued this denied them the right to vote 
in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 The Court 
held that “[w]hen a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated 
segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it 
violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”66 The majority opinion did not 
address plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim. 
In contrast, Justice Whittaker’s concurring opinion argued that 
plaintiffs’ equal right to vote had not been violated because they were 
not treated differently than other voters in their new district.67 
However, he did believe that defendant’s actions had unlawfully 
segregated voters based on race in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.68 
Although both Colegrove and Gomillion sought to challenge 
voter dilution, the Court expressly distinguished Gomillion from 
Colegrove.69 The Court reasoned that in Gomillion “affirmative 
legislative action [had] deprive[d] [the plaintiffs] of their votes and the 
consequent advantages that the ballot affords” because of their race.70 
The racial discrimination “lift[ed] this controversy out of the so-called 
‘political’ arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional 
litigation.”71 However, the Court also used an almost identical 
argument to the one made by Justice Black in his Colegrove dissent to 
hold that a statute is not immune from constitutional challenges simply 
because it involves a political mechanism.72 In fact, although Justice 
Douglas joined the majority opinion, he noted that he “adheres to the 
dissents in Colegrove v. Green,” suggesting he does not believe racial 
classifications were necessary for judicial involvement.73 
Gomillion established that, in some circumstances, courts could 
hear claims that a state’s redistricting plan was unconstitutional. Thus, 
 
 64. Id. at 340. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 346. 
 67. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 346 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 346–47. 
 72. See id. at 347. 
 73. See id. at 348 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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this case created one of the first constraints on redistricting—a statute 
could not discriminate against a racial group. 
In 1962, in Baker v. Carr,74 the Court would again expand on the 
limits of redistricting. Plaintiffs alleged the Tennessee legislature had 
failed to enact a new redistricting statute since 1901 and, as result of 
population growth, votes in some counties were apportioned more 
weight than others.75 Thus, plaintiffs claimed their votes had been 
debased in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.76 Although the 
Court did not rule on the merits of the case, it established that an Equal 
Protection claim based on unequal populations within districts could 
succeed.77 
In determining if the case involved a political question, the Court 
reiterated that a discrimination claim based on Equal Protection does 
not become non-justiciable merely because it involves a political 
right.78 Instead a claim is a political question when there is “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it.”79 
Baker and similar, subsequent cases based on population inequity 
ultimately established the “one person, one vote” rule, which requires 
reasonably equal populations in each district.80 
C.  Modern Jurisprudence: Into the Political Thicket 
A comparison of the holdings in Colegrove and Baker shows the 
shift in the Court’s treatment of redistricting claims. The Court no 
longer believed that all redistricting claims were non-justiciable, and 
 
 74. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 75. Id. at 191–92. “We are told that single vote in Moore County, Tennessee is worth 19 votes 
in Hamilton County . . . .” Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 193–94 (majority opinion). 
 77. See id. at 237. 
 78. Id. at 209–10. 
 79. See id. at 217. As shown below, these two factors have proven to be the most used in 
subsequent cases. However, the Court identifies six factors in total: “[A] textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.” Id. 
 80. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 32–33. 
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the dissent in Colegrove would prove to predict this change. The Court 
now agreed that a district map could be invalidated based on race and 
unequal population.81 Moreover, the Court expressed the belief that 
the Fourteenth Amendment standard could be used to evaluate 
gerrymandering claims.82 However, the Court’s consensus would end 
there. The two cases discussed below show how the Court has had a 
more difficult time deciding just what the Equal Protection standard 
requires. 
In 1986, Davis v. Bandemer83 attempted to establish a standard of 
review that would be used to evaluate whether partisan 
gerrymandering violated the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs were 
Democrats in Indiana who alleged that the Republican controlled state 
legislature intentionally redistricted for the purpose of disadvantaging 
Democrats.84 The results of the 1982 election showed Democrats did 
not gain seats proportional to the number of votes received.85 For 
example, in the House elections, Democratic candidates won 51.9% 
of the votes, but received only forty-three of the one-hundred seats.86 
The Court addressed whether Plaintiffs’ claim was justiciable and, if 
so, what standard should applied to determine whether an equal 
protection violation occurred.87 The result was a widely divided 
opinion. 
A majority of the Court, 6-3, held that a partisan gerrymandering 
claim could be justiciable.88 In contrast, the three dissenting Justices 
asserted that the claim involved a political question, because there was 
no judicially manageable standard under which the Court could 
analyze it.89 In addition, although the majority agreed that there is a 
standard to evaluate these Equal Protection claims, they disagreed on 
what standard courts should apply. 
A plurality of four Justices advocated for a test that would require 
plaintiffs to show both intent to discriminate against a group and an 
actual discriminatory effect.90 To prove discriminatory effect, 
 
 81. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960). 
 82. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
 83. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 84. Id. at 115. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 118. 
 88. Id. at 127. 
 89. Id. at 148 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 90. Id. at 127 (majority opinion). 
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plaintiffs must show they were consistently denied equal access to the 
political process as a whole.91 A lack of proportional representation, 
especially in a single election cycle, would be insufficient to show 
effect because the power to influence the election goes beyond the 
particular result.92 A losing group is presumed to be adequately 
represented by the winning candidate.93 The holding created an odd 
standard94 under which a court can find intentional discrimination but 
no effect, if a party cannot sufficiently show redistricting biased 
several elections’ results and impacted statewide political power.95 
In 2004, Vieth v. Jubelirer called into question the holding of 
Bandemer.96 The majority opinion, supported by a 5-4 vote, affirmed 
the district court’s decision to dismiss the case, but only four Justices 
agreed it should be dismissed as a non-justiciable issue.97 Justice 
Scalia, writing for those four Justices, argued there was no 
discoverable and manageable standard under which the Court could 
evaluate the claim.98 Justice Scalia noted that in the eighteen years 
since Bandemer, courts have almost unanimously refused to intervene 
in gerrymandering cases, because the Bandemer standard cannot be 
met and no new, better standard has been proposed.99 However, 
Justice Kennedy, the other majority vote, stated in a concurring 
opinion that a judicially manageable standard could exist, but that it 
had not yet been articulated.100 Additionally, three of the four 
dissenting Justices each advocated for a different standard in separate 
dissenting opinions.101 
Thus, while Vieth did not overturn Bandemer or establish that 
partisan gerrymandering was a non-justiciable issue, it did show the 
Court struggled to reach a consensus about the Court’s role in 
gerrymandering claims. Under the Bandemer standard, 
 
 91. Id. at 132. 
 92. Id. at 131–32. 
 93. Id. at 132. 
 94. In the context of other Fourteenth Amendment claims, the courts often note: “the law 
recognizes that a government that sets out to discriminate intentionally in its enforcement of some 
neutral law or policy will rarely if ever fail to achieve its purpose.” Doe v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 
462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 95. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130–31. 
 96. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 281. 
 99. Id. at 281–82. 
 100. Id. at 311. 
 101. Id. at 317. 
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gerrymandering must impact the ability to participate in the electoral 
process as whole, limiting the court’s involvement to only claims of 
gross, widespread gerrymandering.102 A limitation that the majority in 
Vieth believed would be impossible to satisfy.103 Although the Equal 
Protection Clause may prove to be a discoverable and manageable 
standard for some redistricting claims, it appears less helpful in 
evaluating purely political claims. 
D.  Precedents Collide in Gill v. Whitford: Supreme Court 
Showdown Between Bandemer and Vieth 
In 2017, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Gill v. Whitford.104 
Plaintiffs argued they had found a judicially discoverable and 
manageable standard: a three-part burden-shifting test based on the 
test articulated in Bandemer.105 First, a plaintiff would have to show 
an intent by defendants to gerrymander for partisan advantage.106 
Second, she would need to prove actual partisan effect.107 If the 
plaintiff is able to meet her burden, the statute is presumed 
unconstitutional.108 The third element would shift the burden to 
defendants to justify the district make-up based on legitimate state 
policy or the state’s political geography.109 If the defendant is unable 
to rebut the presumption, the court would rule the map 
unconstitutional, invalidating its use in further elections and requiring 
the state to draw a new map.110 
In this case, Plaintiffs claimed that the election results from 2012 
and 2014 showed Democrats have been shut out of the electoral 
process.111 In 2012, Republicans won 48.6% of the votes and sixty out 
of ninety-nine seats, and in 2014, they won 52% of the votes and 63 
seats.112 Plaintiffs contended Republicans achieved these results by 
 
 102. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986). 
 103. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287–89. 
 104. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016); see Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017). 
 105. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 854. 
 106. Id. at 854–55. 
 107. Id. at 855. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. The district court made no finding as to which party should bear the burden of proving 
this element, but found that if the plaintiff had the burden, they had met it. Id. at 911. 
 110. Id. at 855. 
 111. Id. at 853; see Mark Joseph Stern, Is Partisan Gerrymandering Dead?, SLATE 
(Oct. 3, 2017, 4:12 PM) https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/will-gill-v-whitford-kill-
partisan-gerrymandering.html. 
 112. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853. 
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cracking and packing Democrats to waste or dilute their votes, and that 
the newly developed efficiency gap theory is evidence of these 
practices’ effect on the elections.113 
Again, the Court was asked to decide whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides a sufficiently discoverable and manageable 
standard to make gerrymandering claims justiciable. However, as the 
cases have shown, the question of justiciability has created 
increasingly divided opinions. Not only is there debate over the 
appropriate standard, but also what a lack of standard means for the 
justiciability of the claim.114 Moreover, a decision endorsing 
justiciability would only allow court intervention in the most extreme 
cases of gerrymandering. However, any redistricting to disadvantage 
voters should raise serious concerns about the impact it has on voting 
rights. 
IV.  HOW UNCHECKED GERRYMANDERING UNDERMINES 
REPRESENTATION AND SUPPRESSES ELECTIONS 
Every election cycle, voters are inundated with political content 
geared at convincing them of the urgency of their vote and the 
competitiveness of elections. Yet “[t]he first instinct of power is the 
retention of power”115 and state legislatures understand that power can 
be retained “directly by the suppression of competitive elections 
themselves.”116 In addition, the use of technology to draw districts and 
collect information, an increased predictability in voter patterns, and 
 
 113. Id. at 854. The efficiency gap theory offers a simplified equation for determining the 
percentage of votes wasted by each party in a given election. The equation starts with the 
assumption that a winning party “wastes” any votes over the 50% mark because they are more than 
a party needs to win. Who’s Gerry and Why Is He So Bad at Drawing Maps?, MORE PERFECT 
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/whos-gerry-and-why-he-so-bad-drawing-
maps/. In contrast, it assumes that any votes for the losing party in a given district are all “wasted” 
because they did not help achieve a win. Id. In addition, the theory has a number of advantages. 
First, the math can be simplified into a basic equation described above. Mira Bernstein & Moon 
Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 64 NOTICES 
AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1020, 1024 (2017). Second, the efficiency gap can be calculated using 
the results of a single election. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281–83, 309–11 (2004) (compare Justice Scalia, 
finding that a lack of standard makes the claims non-justiciable, with Justice Kennedy, preferring 
to hold off on ruling on justiciability in the hopes that a standard will be articulated). 
 115. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 116. Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 28, 56 (2004). 
(8)52.1_WILSON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019  9:51 PM 
2018] HOW VOTERS CHALLENGE GERRYMANDERING 77 
modern court cases have all allowed political parties to gerrymander 
more effectively in order to secure and maintain their power.117 
There are two ways state legislatures use gerrymandering to 
suppress elections. First, partisan gerrymandering works by diluting 
the strength of the opposing party’s votes.118 The party in power at the 
time of redistricting draws the districts to better secure its control.119 
The controlling party can ensure a favorable outcome, not only in the 
coming election, but also in subsequent election cycles.120 Second, 
bipartisan or “sweetheart” gerrymandering allows both parties to limit 
the competitiveness of elections.121 Both parties agree to draw districts 
to ensure their incumbents are placed in safe districts where voters will 
reliably reelect the chosen candidate.122 
A.  Modern Gerrymandering Conflicts with the Framers’ Intent to 
Protect the Power of the People 
Both kinds of gerrymandering are an affront to the principles of 
democratic representation. This is best understood when considering 
the history and purpose of the House of Representatives. The two-
house structure of Congress represents The Great Compromise struck 
between Federalists, who wanted Congress to derive its power directly 
from the people, and Anti-Federalists, who argued Congress should be 
chosen by state governments.123 Thus, the House was created based on 
two founding principles. 
First, the House was intended to represent the will of the people, 
separate from the interests of the states.124 Thus, the number of House 
representatives is based on population, rather than the geographical 
boundaries of the state.125 Second, its election procedures were created 
to ensure the House was sympathetic to and dependent on the concerns 
of the people.126 House elections are held every two years, and, in a 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See supra Part II. 
 119. Pildes, supra note 116, at 59. 
 120. Id. at 59–60. For example, the McGann Study claims the bias found by researchers will 
persist until 2022, the first election after the next redistricting cycle. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 
29, at 3. 
 121. Pildes, supra note 116, at 60–61. 
 122. Id. 
 123. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 179. 
 124. Id. at 181. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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functioning election system, members must respond to the changing 
concerns of their constituents or be voted out of office.127 
In contrast, when state legislatures are allowed to aggressively 
gerrymander, the states, rather than the people, are given control over 
House elections.128 Article 1, Section 4 of the United States 
Constitution gives state legislatures the power to draw their own 
congressional and state districts.129 But states are only required to 
redistrict every ten years in response to the Census.130 As a result, 
gerrymandering allows the party in control of the state legislature at 
the time of redistricting to control the outcome of House elections for 
the next decade.131 Thus, states are not only picking their House 
representatives, but representatives also have little fear of removal, 
leaving any accountability to the voters diminished or lost during those 
ten years.132 
The Framers of the Constitution anticipated this problem. James 
Madison argued that if states have the sole power to draw districts they 
would create districts that favored certain candidates for the state 
legislature and “the inequality of the Representation in the 
Legislatures of particular States [] would produce a like inequality in 
their representation in the Nat[ional] Legislature, as it was presumable 
that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it 
to themselves in the latter.”133 Thus, additional language was added to 
Article 1, Section 4 that gives Congress the authority to “make or 
alter” the districts created by states.134 
 
 127. See id. For example, a study done by Soroka and Wlezien found that a government that 
has elections every two years is more responsive to rapid changes in public opinion than a 
government that holds elections every four to five years. Id. at 192. 
 128. Id. at 190. 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress 
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”). 
 130. SCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 4. 
 131. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 191. Potentially more concerning is the ability of 
state legislatures to use gerrymandering to ensure outcomes in state elections. If a party can draw 
state legislative districts to guarantee their party secures a majority in the state legislature, that same 
party can gerrymander the House elections with little opposition. However, little research has been 
done on modern levels of partisan gerrymandering of state electoral districts. Id. at 191. So, the 
issue will not be discussed further in this Note. 
 132. Id. at 194–95. 
 133. Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 240–41 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)). 
 134. Id. at 275; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
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However, the increased partisan nature of our political system and 
extensive integration of state and national parties has undermined the 
Framers’ intentions.135 It is questionable whether Congress has ever 
acted as a check on the states’ self-interested behavior,136 but now, 
more than ever, Congress is incentivized to pressure state leaders to 
aggressively gerrymander to secure party seats.137 Moreover, parties 
may challenge specific state maps in an attempt to decrease the 
opposing party’s power but both parties benefit from gerrymandering. 
Thus, it is difficult to imagine Congressional representatives enacting 
laws to challenge the system that elected them, despite any violations 
it inflicts on constituents’ representational rights. In fact, “a 
representative may feel more beholden to the cartographers who drew 
her district than to the constituents who live there.”138 
B.  Federal Courts Are Reluctant to Combat Gerrymandering 
Furthermore, the authority given to Congress by Article I, Section 
4’s “make or alter”139 language has affected how the courts view 
redistricting claims. First, courts have been concerned that 
redistricting claims are not justiciable because Section 4 creates a 
“constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department.”140 In Colegrove, the Court cites Section 4 as giving 
Congress, not the courts, the power to ensure fair representation in the 
House.141 Subsequent cases would find at least some individual claims 
are justiciable, and limit the question of gerrymandering’s 
 
 135. Pildes, supra note 116, at 61. 
 136. Congress has exercised its authority to combat gerrymandering with decreasing frequency. 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276; MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 24. Between 1842 and 1911, Congress 
enacted a series of Apportionment Acts that imposed requirements on redistricting such as 
contiguity, compactness, and equal population. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276; MCGANN ET AL., supra note 
29. However, each new act superseded the previous and the only remaining requirement is states 
must use single member districts. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276. In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting 
Rights Act, which has seen a success. Pildes, supra note 116, at 59. For example, beginning in the 
early twentieth century, Southern Democrats used gerrymandering to “destroy [their] political 
competitors . . . and thereby created a one-party monopoly that ruled the entire region” until the 
passage of the act. Id. Since 1980, Congress has also introduced several bills, but none have passed. 
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277. 
 137. Pildes, supra note 116, at 61. 
 138. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 470 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress 
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”). 
 140. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946). 
 141. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554. 
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justiciability to the existence of a manageable and discoverable 
standard. But, the reasoning in Colegrove has twisted through 
opinions and dissents all the way to Vieth.142 While Vieth did not 
concern Article 1, Section 4, Justice Scalia still began the plurality 
opinion by laying out the basis and history of Section 4 as a remedy to 
the issues created by gerrymandering.143 
In addition, federal courts have historically been reluctant to 
invalidate districts because they believe if “Congress failed in 
exercising its powers . . . the remedy ultimately lies with the people” 
to elect officials who will.144 The logic of this assumption goes hand 
in hand with another common argument: constituents’ rights are not 
violated by the use of politics in districting because “today’s minority 
could be tomorrow’s majority” and so representatives are sensitive to 
all constituents’ concerns.145 However, as discussed below, these 
assumptions are being challenged by social science research. 
Thus, the combination of congressional noninvolvement and 
judicial reluctance to intervene has given state legislatures the green 
light to begin foreordaining election results. Research on House 
elections has shown a recent increase in partisan and sweetheart 
gerrymandering. As a result, legislatures are increasingly incentivized 
to undermine fair elections by effectively disenfranchising voters who 
are unable to vote them out. 
C.  Research on State Legislatures’ Ability to Control Elections 
In Gerrymandering in America, researchers Anthony McGann, 
Charles Smith, Michael Latner, and Alex Keena lay out the 
methodology and results of the study they conducted on partisan 
gerrymandering after Vieth (“McGann Study”). The researchers 
hypothesized that while Vieth did not make gerrymandering claims 
non-justiciable, state legislatures would view the plurality opinion as 
effectively removing the courts from the conversation.146 And in fact, 
they found that redistricting done after Vieth created significant bias 
 
 142. Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 275, 285 (2004). 
 143. See id. at 275. 
 144. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554. 
 145. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 469–70 (2006); Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986). 
 146. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 1. 
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in the voting process that can only be attributed to states pushing for 
partisan advantage more aggressively than ever before.147 
The McGann Study compared the results of House elections from 
2002 to 2012.148 The basis of the methodology is partisan symmetry, 
which looks to see if all parties would gain the same number of seats 
if they won a given percentage of the vote.149 For example, in an 
unbiased system, both Party A and Party B would receive 60% of the 
seats if they won 55% of votes in a given state. If Party A can win the 
same number of seats as Party B with less votes, there is a bias.150 The 
study looked at the presence and effect of bias on national elections, 
as well as in individual state results.151 
The results of the McGann Study show a sharp increase in bias 
towards Republicans at the national level in the 2012 election.152 The 
study found the asymmetrical bias was 9.38%, meaning Republicans 
gained 9.38% more seats than Democrats would have gained for the 
same percentage of votes.153 In contrast, the results of the 2002–2010 
elections only had an asymmetry level of 3.4% in favor of 
Republicans.154 The level of bias found in the 2002–2010 election “is 
only 35% of the bias [] observe[d] in 2012.”155 
The McGann Study also looked at the results of the House 
elections in each state. The level of bias found at the state level is even 
more problematic. Looking at the ten most biased states, their level of 
asymmetry for 2012 fell between approximately 30% and 40%, in 
favor of Republicans.156 This means that if Republicans received 52% 
of the votes and won 70% of the seats, Democrats would only receive 
30% to 40% of the seats for the same 52% of votes.157 In comparison, 
in the 2002–2010 elections there were fewer states that had a pro-
Republican bias, and the level of bias was much lower, and there were 
more states with a pro-Democrat bias.158 
 
 147. Id. at 3. 
 148. Id. at 57. 
 149. Id. at 65–66. 
 150. Id. at 66. 
 151. Id. at 56. 
 152. Id. at 56. 
 153. Id. at 71. 
 154. Id. at 72. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 73. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 81. 
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Next, the researchers hypothesized that two additional factors 
would need to be true to show the increase was due to political 
motives.159 First, that bias would be found predominately in states 
where a party had the motive and opportunity to redistrict to the 
party’s advantage.160 The study found legislatures were only 
motivated to engage in partisan districting in states that had 
competitive elections.161 Also, a party had sufficient opportunity when 
it controlled the state legislature and the governor was a member of 
that party.162 Second, states redistricting in 2012 would create more 
bias, even in states that were already biased.163 This could be shown 
in two ways. One, states that already had Republican bias in 2010 
would have significantly more bias in 2012.164 Two, the states that 
were biased towards Democrats but became Republican in 2010 
would have much higher levels of bias in 2012 as compared to 
previous years.165 
The McGann Study found that both of these assumptions to be 
true. Fourteen of the eighteen states where the level of bias was 
statistically significant were found to have legislatures with a motive 
and an opportunity to engage in partisan gerrymandering.166 “Thus, 
with only a few exceptions, the presence of partisan control of the 
districting process and electoral competitiveness at the electoral level 
seem to be both necessary and sufficient conditions for partisan 
bias.”167 Next, the study showed that legislatures redistricted for 
partisan advantage more aggressively after 2010. In many states that 
already had a pro-Republican bias in 2002, the bias almost doubled 
and accounted for a 2.8% increase in national bias.168 Also, the bias in 
states that did not have a Republican bias in 2002, but became 
Republican biased in 2012, accounted for 3.7% of the national 
increase.169 In previous years, Republicans would be expected to 
create bias in a similar amount to the Democrats, but instead the study 
 
 159. Id. at 146–47. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 148–49. 
 162. Id. at 148. 
 163. Id. at 158. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 158–59. 
 166. Id. at 157. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 161. 
 169. Id. at 162. 
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shows they increased the bias by a large margin.170 These results 
support the McGann Study’s claims that Vieth is actually responsible 
for the increase in redistricting bias, because the alternative variables 
did not change significantly between 2002 and 2012.171 These results 
raise a number of concerns about whether the House is properly 
functioning as a representative form of government. 
Moreover, a 2006 study by Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, 
and Mathew Gunning found that the 2002 and 2004 elections were the 
least competitive general elections in United States history as a result 
of bi-partisan gerrymandering.172 Generally, elections following 
redistricting, such as the 2002 election, see the most turn-over, but 
only four of almost four hundred House incumbents lost the general 
election.173 Of the 381 incumbents that did win, only forty-three won 
by less than a landslide, defined as a victory of more than 60%.174 
Moreover, a “competitive election” is generally characterized as one 
in which the winner receives less than 55% of the votes.175 In 2002, 
less than 10% of House elections were competitive.176 As such, House 
incumbents had a reelection rate of 99% in 2002.177 More alarming is 
the fact that these results were fairly consistent until 2010 when states 
were forced to redistrict.178 
Furthermore, the lack of competitiveness cannot be attributed to 
voter preference for incumbents. United States Senate and 
gubernatorial elections are held on a statewide basis and therefore are 
not susceptible to gerrymandering.179 These elections are held on the 
same day as House elections and about half of the 2002 races were 
 
 170. Id. For example, in 2010, Republicans in North Carolina won enough seats to gain control 
of the state legislature. Id. In 2002, when the Democrats controlled, the level of pro-Democrat bias 
was about 10%. Id. If Republicans were not redistricting more aggressively after Vieth, the results 
of the 2012 election should show a pro-Republican bias of about 10%. Id. Instead, the 10% pro-
Democrat bias was replaced by a 36.6% pro-Republican bias. Id. 
 171. Id. at 70. 
 172. Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in 
U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 75 (2006). 
 173. Pildes, supra note 116, at 62. 
 174. Id. at 62–63. 
 175. See id. at 63. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Jaime Fuller, There Are 405 House Races Where the Frontrunner Has a 90% Chance of 
Winning, WASH. POST, May 29, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/05/29/there-are-only-30-house-races-this-year-where-the-election-hasnt-already-
been-decided/?utm_term=.b6af216efaf7. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 20, at 573. 
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competitive.180 The election results from California are often cited to 
demonstrate the disparity.181 In 2002, every House incumbent from 
California won by a landslide, meaning no challenger received over 
40% of the votes.182 In contrast, just a year later California voters 
“rebelled in mass against the political status quo” and held a special 
election to oust the elected governor and replace him with Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, who is generally considered politically 
independent.183 
Thus, when incumbents use sweetheart gerrymandering to create 
safe seats, “even a significant shift in popular preference would have 
little effect on who gets elected.”184 Unlike partisan gerrymandering, 
sweetheart gerrymandering does not allow one party to win seats 
disproportional to votes they receive. Instead, if 60% of voters register 
as Democrats, the state legislature will district to ensure Democrats 
win 60% of the seats.185 So, the standards proposed by both Justices 
and plaintiffs to evaluate the constitutionality of redistricting laws 
would fail to find non-competitive elections a violation of voters’ 
rights. 
V.  STATE COURTS AS THE NEW CHAMPIONS OF VOTING RIGHTS 
Because the United States Constitution does not include an 
express right to vote, federal courts have used the Fourteenth 
Amendment to extend protections for voting rights to include forms of 
vote dilution.186 In the context of partisan gerrymandering, federal 
jurisprudence has limited these protections only to those cases where 
the plaintiffs can show they have been denied a chance to influence 
the political process as a whole.187 This standard does not include 
incumbent protection or potentially less overt methods of 
gerrymandering. This Part will argue that state courts are the better 
positioned to protect the right to vote because they are not limited by 
federal precedent and are free to interpret the scope of voting rights 
contained in their own constitutions. 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. E.g., id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Pildes, supra note 116, at 64. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). 
 187. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986). 
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A.  Additional Protection of the Right to Vote from the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
The United States Constitution does not include any provisions 
expressly identify voting as a fundamental right. Instead, the 
Constitution discusses elections in several clauses, but these clauses 
only dictate the process of voting.188 No clause specifically 
enumerates the right to vote.189 In addition, the Fourteenth, 
Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments only convey “negative” rights, or prohibitions on 
governmental actions.190 As a result, early federal courts doubted 
whether the Constitution created a right to vote.191 
Moreover, the early Supreme Court cases that described the right 
to vote as fundamental do not cite any particular constitutional 
provision in support of this conclusion.192 Instead, the Court based its 
decision on the important role voting plays in the preservation of 
democracy.193 For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,194 the Court stated: 
“Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege 
merely conceded by society, according to its will, under certain 
conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right, 
because preservative of all rights.”195 
Finally, in the 1960s, a series of decisions by the Warren Court 
would establish the Equal Protection Clause as the constitutional basis 
for challenging laws that treated votes unequally.196 Because the 
United States Constitution does not include an express right to vote, 
federal courts have used the Fourteenth Amendment to hold the right 
 
 188. See supra note 28 (quoting the text of U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 4, 5). 
 189. Joshua Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 95 
(2014). 
 190. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating the punishment for states who prohibit eligible 
citizens from voting); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (the right to vote shall not be denied based on race); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (granting states the same control over Senate elections that Article 1, 
Section 2 gives them over House elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (the right to vote shall not 
be denied based on sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (the right to vote shall not be denied based on 
ability to a pay poll tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (the right to vote shall not be denied based on 
age). 
 191. See Douglas, supra note 189, at 96–97 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 
(1874) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one 
. . . .”). 
 192. Id. at 97. 
 193. Id. 
 194. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 195. Id. at 370. 
 196. See Douglas, supra note 189, at 97. 
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to vote is protected beyond the prohibitions listed in other 
amendments. Of course, the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the right to vote was not novel: Justice Black had argued that 
voting rights were protected from improper redistricting by the 
Fourteenth Amendment in his dissenting opinion from Colegrove in 
1946.197 But it was not until Baker that the Court held that the right to 
vote, secured by the Equal Protection Clause, may be violated by 
gerrymandering.198 In deciding that the claim was justiciable, the 
Court looked to the Fourteenth Amendment to locate a judicial 
standard for gerrymandering claims.199 The Court held that the 
“[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well 
developed and familiar” and that the courts are well adept at 
determining when “discrimination reflects no policy, but simply 
arbitrary and capricious action.”200 
However, the courts would come to realize that applying these 
“well developed and familiar standards” to redistricting claims would 
be more difficult than the Baker Court believed. The issue for the 
courts was identifying just what was “arbitrary and capricious” 
because reasonable judges could disagree about whether maps 
reflected intentional discrimination or naturally accruing 
imbalances.201 In response to these concerns, the Court adopted the 
one person, one vote doctrine, a clear bright-line rule for 
reapportionment cases.202 In contrast, the Court in Gill was still trying 
to define a clear standard for gerrymandering cases. 
B.  Gerrymandering and the Impossible Fourteenth Amendment 
Standard 
Once the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment offered 
protections for voting rights, the courts began to grapple with the 
question: how much politics is too much politics in the redistricting 
 
 197. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 198. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary 
impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution . . 
. .”). 
 199. Id. at 226. 
 200. Id. 
 201. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 193 (2012). 
 202. Id. at 193–94; see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“The Equal 
Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all 
citizens, of all places as well as of all races.”). 
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process.203 A question that has proven significantly more difficult to 
answer than how equal do populations within districts have to be. As 
a result, the federal jurisprudence on gerrymandering has limited the 
applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment protections to 
gerrymandering cases. 
Building on the holding in Baker, the Bandemer Court would find 
that political redistricting claims were justiciable, in part because the 
Fourteenth Amendment provided a discoverable and manageable 
standard.204 And, just as the Justices in Baker suggested, the Court 
used a familiar Equal Protection standard: intent plus effect.205 
However, deciding on this test got courts no closer to deciding 
how much politics is acceptable. The standard was initially developed 
for racial discrimination cases, where any showing of discriminatory 
effect, based on discriminatory intent, is sufficient.206 In contrast, the 
Court has held that some amount of redistricting for political gain is 
inevitable and legal.207 For instance, redistricting to protect 
incumbents has long been held to be a legitimate motive.208 As a result, 
the Court held that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when 
the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently 
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political 
process as a whole.”209 
This standard created two serious problems for future litigants. 
First, the holding is based on assumptions that are being challenged by 
research done on the House elections since 2000.210 The Court reasons 
that the power to influence elections as a whole cannot be determined 
by the loss of one election.211 The losing party voters are presumed to 
be adequately represented by the winning party’s representative and 
can change the outcome of the next elections if they are not.212 
 
 203. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 297 (2004) (defining the original unanswered 
question as “How much political motivation and effect is too much?”). 
 204. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1986). 
 205. Id. at 127. 
 206. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281, 285–86. 
 207. Id. at 285–86. 
 208. Id. at 298. 
 209. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132. 
 210. See discussion on the McGann study and the competitiveness of the 2002 elections, supra 
Part IV. 
 211. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131–32. 
 212. Id. at 132, 135. 
(8)52.1_WILSON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019  9:51 PM 
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:63 
However, redistricting can affect a party’s ability to win an election 
for a decade.213 
The second issue is that despite the increase in research conducted 
on elections and gerrymandering, the Bandemer test has proven to be 
a potentially impossible standard. Writing for the plurality in Vieth, 
Justice Scalia detailed the difficulty courts have had in applying the 
Bandemer test, specifically noting that in the eighteen years since the 
test was developed no court has invalidated a map based on 
gerrymandering.214 As a result, the plurality held that “[b]ecause this 
standard was misguided when proposed, has not been improved in 
subsequent application, and is not even defended before us today by 
the appellants, we decline to affirm it as a constitutional 
requirement.”215 
However, the plurality was not able to undo the precedent set by 
Bandemer, and the plaintiffs in Gill are again attempting to persuade 
the Court that this standard can be met. But, given the Court’s 
requirement that plaintiffs show they have been “shut out of the 
political process,”216 the question becomes, why are plaintiffs looking 
to the Fourteenth Amendment to protect their rights against vote 
dilutions? Legal scholars have suggested alternative suits could be 
brought under the First Amendment217 or Due Process Clause.218 
However, given the Court’s ambivalence about the justiciability of 
gerrymandering claims, this Note instead argues that state courts offer 
a better forum for such claims. 
C.  State Courts Can Interpret Their Own Constitutions to Protect 
Voting Rights 
State courts offer plaintiffs two advantages: 1) state constitutions 
include more explicit protections for voters, and 2) state courts are not 
limited by the limited and still unsettled federal precedent discussed 
above. 
 
 213. See MCGANN ET AL., supra note 29, at 192. 
 214. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279–280 (2004). 
 215. Id. at 283–84. 
 216. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139. 
 217. See Justin Levitt, Symposium: Intent is Enough, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:44 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-intent-enough/. 
 218. Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle 
for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655 (2017). 
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Unlike federal courts, state courts do not need to search for a 
provision in the United States Constitution to support a finding that 
the right to vote extends to gerrymandering claims. The constitutions 
of forty-nine states explicitly make voting a substantive right.219 These 
provisions (“Voting Provision”) usually include language that a 
citizen “‘shall be qualified to vote,’ ‘shall be entitled to vote,’ or ‘is a 
qualified elector.’”220 Arizona is the only state that uses negative 
language, similar to that found in the United States Constitution, in its 
Voting Provision.221 In addition, twenty-six states provide further 
protection because their constitutions include provisions requiring 
elections to be “‘free,’ ‘free and open,’ or ‘free and equal.’”222 Thus, 
unlike federal courts, state courts do not have to limit their analysis of 
gerrymandering claims by trying to determine which provision of the 
United States Constitution they derive the right to vote from.  
Moreover, state courts should find that state legislatures are 
bound by these Voting Provisions. In Smiley v. Holm,223 the Court 
explained the limits that could be placed on the power given to state 
legislatures under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States  
Constitution (“Election Clause”).224 The Minnesota Constitution 
required any bill passed by the state legislature to be approved by the 
governor or, after reconsideration by the legislature, passed by a two-
thirds vote.225 However, the defendant argued that the Election Clause 
created a duty given to the state legislature which could not be limited 
by the state constitution.226 
The Court disagreed, holding that the Election Clause did not 
confer a duty but rather authority to make laws for the state.227 Because 
the state legislature is exercising its law making power when it 
redistricts, it must use its authority in accordance with the state 
 
 219. Douglas, supra note 189, at 101. 
 220. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting COLO. CONST.  art. VII, § 1; HAW. CONST.  art. II, § 1; 
N.M. CONST.  art. VII, § 1). For more information about the specific language of each state’s Voting 
Rights Clause see the table at the end of Douglas’s article. 
 221. Id. at 102. 
 222. Id. at 103. 
 223. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
 224. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”). 
 225. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 363. 
 226. Id. at 372. 
 227. Id. at 367. 
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constitution.228 Building on the holding in Smiley, the Court, in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission,229 held that a citizen initiative to give redistricting 
control to an independent commission did not violate the Election 
Clause’s grant of authority to state legislatures.230 Thus, state 
legislatures should be equally bound by the Voting Provisions. 
Next, state courts should not bind themselves based on federal 
precedent. In his article State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, Justice Brennan argues that state courts should not 
defer to federal precedent, even when their decisions are based on state 
constitutional provisions that are similarly or identically phrased to 
those in the United States Constitution.231 Instead state courts should 
see decisions based on federal law as merely persuasive and decide for 
themselves if they are convinced by the Supreme Court’s opinions.232 
Importantly, “state courts that rest their decisions wholly or even 
partly on state law need not apply federal principles of standing and 
justiciability that deny litigants access to the courts.”233 Thus, state 
courts do not need to seek a judicially discoverable and manageable 
standard, or use the Bandemer standard, even in cases involving state 
equal protection clauses. 
Moreover, the Bill of Rights was drafted to mirror the rights 
granted under various state constitutions, rather than states reiterating 
federally protected rights in their constitutions.234 In order to draft the 
Bill of Rights, the Framers looked to state constitutions and included 
only rights which were protected by one or more state constitutions.235 
Additionally, until the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and the 
Bill of Rights was held applicable to state action, state constitutions 
were independently interpreted as controls on state actions.236 
Justice Brennan’s reasoning is even more applicable when 
applied to cases based on state constitutional provisions that have no 
analogous United States constitutional provision. As discussed above, 
 
 228. Id. at 367–68. 
 229. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 230. Id. at 2659. 
 231. Brennan, supra note 1, at 500, 502. 
 232. Id. at 502. 
 233. Id. at 501. 
 234. Id. 
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state constitutions include provisions expressly granting citizens the 
right to vote, while the United States Constitution only provides 
prohibitions on government actions.237 State courts interpreting the 
Voting Provisions, therefore, have no controlling federal cases 
interpreting a federal counter part. Moreover, it can be inferred by the 
inclusion of Voting Provisions that states did not believe the United 
States Constitution provided adequate protection for such an important 
right. Therefore, if state courts were to base their decisions on federal 
gerrymandering jurisprudence, they would “thwart[] a state court’s 
ability to provide the heightened level of protection that state 
constitutions’ direct provision of the right to vote demands.”238 
Instead, state courts should use federal jurisprudence only as a 
guideline for deciding what protection their respective constitutions 
offer. Accordingly, state courts would be a much better forum to 
litigate gerrymandering claims, regardless of the outcome of Gill. 
State courts do not need to base gerrymandering claims on violations 
of the Fourteenth Amendment or worry about federal justiciability. 
Historically, state courts have protected individuals from improper 
actions by state governments, and, given the extensive impact 
gerrymandering has on voters’ rights, the courts should not shy away 
from the opportunity to do so now. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Over the last decade gerrymandering has attracted a higher level 
of public consciousness, possibly due to a combination of social 
media, the twenty-four-hour news cycle, and the willingness of 
legislatures to gerrymander even more aggressively. The public’s 
increasing dissatisfaction with the United States electoral system and 
with the representatives it puts in power has created a perfect storm. 
More voters are looking for a way to combat what they see as unfair 
voting processes. But in the case of gerrymandering, it appears that 
Congress and the federal courts are unable or unwilling to provide 
much protection. 
This Note has offered an overview of how gerrymandering works 
to undermine the intent of the Framers to create representational 
government. Modern election results may be less reflective of the 
 
 237. Douglas, supra note 189, at 101. 
 238. See id. at 124. 
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voters’ choices and more reflective of legislative interference. In 
addition, this Note has provided a basic summary of notoriously 
complicated federal Equal Protection voting rights jurisprudence in 
the hope of giving the reader an understanding of the difficulties faced 
by federal litigants. Sometimes gerrymandering works in small, subtle 
ways that nevertheless affect the voters’ ability to elect 
representatives. In addition, incumbent protection makes 
representatives less responsive to the will of voters and diminishes 
voters’ power to respond. 
This Note argues that state courts could be an alternative to the 
uphill battle litigants face in federal courts. State courts offer voters a 
chance to create new, stronger protections against gerrymandering that 
are not limited by federal precedent. First, state courts can use the 
states’ Voting Provisions, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
invalidate district maps. Second, state courts have the freedom to 
create a higher level of protection, beyond only that form of 
gerrymandering that deprives someone or a group of access to the 
political process as whole. In fact, state courts have historically 
interpreted their constitutions as creating broader rights than those 
found in the United States Constitution. Precisely because these 
Voting Provisions have no analogous United States constitutional 
provision, there is no controlling federal authority to handcuff state 
courts. Thus, state courts should take up the call by voters to protect 
the integrity of elections, and to create new limits on gerrymandering. 
 
